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Mihaela Mihai, Edinburgh University 
 
The Caring Refusenik: A Portrait1 
 
Forthcoming in Constellations, pre-proof version. 
 
Abstract 
Reconciliation refuseniks are considered ‘spoilers’ of the effort to mobilise compassion in the wake 
of systemic political violence. This paper deflects this accusation and, building on feminist theory, 
advances the notion of caring refusal, one motivated by a commitment to and care for the 
plurivocality of the collective hermeneutical space where political memory is forged. The caring 
refusenik demands a lucid reckoning with grey zones of moral and political duplicity, usually 
obscured by ‘grands récits’ of reconciliation. Inviting public reflection on ‘rhinoceration’ – to 
borrow Eugène Ionesco’s metaphor for the breakdown of communication, ideological 
contamination, self-deception, adjustment, and accommodation to systemic violence – the 
refusenik problematises the political continuities left untouched by neutralising master narratives. 
To give concreteness to this proposal I introduce Norman Manea, a Jewish Romanian intellectual, 
whose work constitutes an enduring, caring refusal. His interventions help identify the virtues and 




Reckoning with the past is a complex, multi-directional hermeneutical exercise, involving both 
memory and the imagination: it includes sifting through and interpreting events, practices and 
actions such that the past can be read in relation to the present and the future. Certain ‘grands 
récits’ of reconciliation colonise a community’s hermeneutical exercise, closing off the political 
space of meaning where different visions of ‘what happened’ could be expressed and contested 
publicly. The ideological hijacking of reconciliation makes the object of a complex and insightful 
literature (Norval, 1998; Schaap, 2004, 2008; Moon, 2006; Hirsch, 2013; Khoury, 2017). I follow 
in these thinkers’ footsteps by focusing on a particular aspect of the potential ideological over-
                                                
1 This paper was presented at ECPR Oslo 2017 and at a workshop on ‘Resisting Reconciliation’ organised by 
colleagues from Monash University, I thank all participants for their valuable suggestions. Special thanks are owed 
to Mathias Thaler, Mónica Brito-Vieira, Maria Alina Asavei, Maša Mrovlje, Bogdan Popa, Nadim Khoury, Andrew 
Schaap, Paul Muldoon and Lukas Slothuus. The journal’s editor and anonymous reviewers provided excellent 
comments. Work for this paper was financed under the European Research Council Starting Grant 637709. 
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determination of reconciliation: this paper is interested in those visions of reconciliation that 
obscure the area of wide-spread ideological contamination and complicity with systemic violence.2 
This area is often strategically erased from master historical narratives. As I show below, post-
Vichy France, South Africa post-apartheid, Argentina after 1983 can all be counted examples of 
contexts where the imposition of the official story – however justifiably pragmatic at the time –  
marginalised alternative, contestatory voices and left the grey zone untouched for long periods. 
Conveniently palatable accounts are often manufactured and publicly sanctioned in view of 
sustaining a glorious – if tragic – view of the past and outlining a luminous blueprint for the future. 
However, in their absolutist intransigence, such visions risk maintaining the community’s 
hermeneutical space closed, reproducing the very practices and relationships of exclusion – 
economic, political, cultural – that led to violence in the first place. 
 
Bringing together insights from the rich literatures on hermeneutical oppression and care ethics, I 
propose to interpret the refusal of such ‘grands récits’ as the expression of a caring commitment 
to nurturing a plurivocal political-hermeneutical space, protecting it from becoming closed-off. 
On the one hand, theorists of hermeneutical oppression (Alcoff, 2010, 2015; Maitra, 2011; 
Pohlhaus, 2012; Origgi, 2012; Dotson, 2011, 2012, 2014; Medina, 2013) help account for the 
complex social, political and economic mechanisms behind the exclusion of certain narratives 
about the past from collective meaning-making processes. The silencing of certain voices and 
visions has been of ongoing interest in feminist (Lugones, 1987; Hornsby & Langton, 1998; Alcoff, 
2000), critical race (Mills, 1998, 2007; Collins, 2000), and postcolonial theory (Mohanty, 2003; 
Spivak, 2013; Mignolo, 2009; Santos, 2014). This extensive body of work also contributes to 
understanding the impact of exclusionary hermeneutical relationships on the communities 
involved.  
 
On the other hand, care ethics helps develop the idea of caring refusal and highlights the long-
term value of resisting too facile visions of reconciliation, visions that high-jack the space of 
debate. Care ethics scholars have articulated the ontological presuppositions, the virtues and pre-
requisites of care beyond the space of the home and public institutions traditionally associated 
with caring. Feminists have long extrapolated the value of care to tackling environmental 
degradation (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990), peace-making (Ruddick, 1995), terrorism and domestic 
                                                
2 By ‘systemic violence’ I mean the complex apparatus of repression that authoritarian and totalitarian states set up 
for securing absolute power. These include specifically repressive institutions, such as the political police, but also 
the legal system, the medical profession, the educational system, and the mass media, often subordinated to the goal 
of stifling all forms of dissent. 
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violence (Held, 2010), global structures of marginalisation, humanitarian intervention, global 
poverty and security (Mahon & Robinson, 2011; Robinson, 1998, 2010, 2011, 2013), law 
enforcement and prison management (Stensöta, 2015) or anxieties associated with globalisation 
(Pulcini, 2013). This paper builds on these scholars’ work and proposes that the openness – 
plurivocality and kaleidoscopicity – of processes of memory-making and political renewal 
constitute important objects of care. Caring for this openness will sometimes require rejecting 
certain occluding master narratives that colonise the space of deliberation.  
 
The main argument advanced here is that caring for a plural space of memory – a space where 
various visions of the future are also articulated in relation to ‘what happened’ – requires the 
inclusion of accounts about the structural underpinnings of violence within the conversation. In 
refusing obscuring projects of reconciliation – that leave untouched violence-genic forms of social 
relationality – this labour of care aims to foster inclusive political-hermeneutical relations between 
the members of the community, who almost never share a uniform view of the past. The hope is 
that complex, competing narratives of the past can emerge from a more balanced space of 
intelligibility, preventing its monopolisation by any ‘Final’ affirmation of ‘The Truth’.  
 
How does caring refusal manifest itself? To give concreteness to the juxtaposition of caring and 
refusal, I use Norman Manea’s work and outline the caring refusenik’s portrait.3 Manea is a Jewish 
Romanian intellectual who lived through both extreme right- and extreme left-wing dictatorships 
in his native Romania. This experience allowed him to think critically about how societies often 
replace one monolithic, uncompromising ideological view of history with another, failing to 
accommodate alternative, differently positioned narratives. Importantly for this paper, he also 
witnessed the after-effects of these hermeneutical closures in post-1989 memory and reconciliation 
narratives. His work offers us ample material to exemplify how the caring refusenik performs her 
risky work. 
 
The first part of the paper introduces Eugène Ionesco’s 1959 play, The Rhinoceros and his metaphor 
of ‘rhinoceration’. It constitutes a good entry point for theorising the slow processes of 
authoritarian ideological contagion and widespread complicity with systematic violence. Ionesco 
also warns us that such processes are not without remainders. In dialogue with the literature on 
hermeneutical injustice, I focus on the hermeneutical faces of ‘rhinoceration’ and its recalcitrant 
legacies. I then move on to a discussion of the theoretical resources care ethics provides for an 
                                                
3 I use the term metaphorically and generically, to depict somebody who refuses to accept a settlement or a norm. 
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account of caring refusal in relation to exclusionary hermeneutical relations. I propose that the 
plurivocality of memory and future-making processes are a suitable object of care. Finally, I draw 
the portrait of an archetypal caring refusenik, as it emerges from Manea’s work.  
 
On Rhinoceros 
The Rhinoceros (1959) by French-Romanian playwright Eugène Ionesco (1909–1994) captures a 
society’s ideological contamination and gradual slide into complicitous accommodation to 
systemically violent regimes, characteristic of 20th Century’s authoritarianisms. I propose to read 
the play as an account of how the plural space of meaning and the hermeneutical relationships 
underpinning it are destroyed, through the gradual substitution of political conversations with 
incomprehensible animal noises – a reference to the intolerant proclamations of authoritarian 
ideologies. Nobody is perfectly immune and, importantly for this paper, the play also 
problematises the sequelae of such transformations. Rhinoceration is one of the thorniest, most 
uncomfortable challenges for memory-making projects, often pushed under the historical carpet.  
This enables the continuation of certain political-hermeneutical exclusions, of absolutist tropes 
and habits, reflected in problematic blind-spots and obstructions within political memory. It is 
such continuities that often motivate refuseniks in their caring rejection of simplistic visions of the 
past.  
 
The play narrates how all but one of the inhabitants of a provincial town turn into rhinoceros. Act 
I begins on a Sunday afternoon, with a conversation between friends, Bérenger and Jean, on a café 
patio. Bérenger is a misfit, who cannot ‘get used to life’ and who resorts to alcohol to alleviate his 
spleen, while Jean embodies the perfectly adjusted citizen. He loves his job and embraces his daily 
routines unquestioningly. As various other characters go about their daily business in their vicinity, 
suddenly, a rhinoceros gallops by, raising a cloud of dust and momentarily alarming everyone. 
After a minute of shock and awe, things slowly fall back into place. Everybody goes back to what 
they were doing before this bizarre apparition, when another animal passes by, trampling a cat. 
Although outrage accompanies this second incident and a clerk suggests that the authorities should 
intervene (‘how can it be possible in a civilised country?’), the characters sustain a dreamlike, 
obsessive conversation full of clichés, about the correct species of the animal: was this an Asian 
or an African rhinoceros? 
 
As the play progresses, we understand that humans are turning into rhinoceros. More and more 
people get green skin and grow horns. Ionesco intimates that the transformation is not entirely 
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outside one’s control; it is nothing like an accident, but more like a choice one makes from within 
one’s social situation. Personal ambition, class, political commitments, a corrupt sense of solidarity 
and cowardice gradually lead to a reversal of norms: rhinoceros begin to appear beautiful, strong, 
noble and harmless. If you are not a rhinoceros yourself, you only need get out of their way when 
they crisscross the town in herds at great speed. Everyone has a friend, a colleague or a relative 
among the rhinoceros – which makes it difficult to formulate a joint position on their destructive 
presence: social allegiances and identities feed and render rhinocerisation normal. Complicity and 
accommodation emerge as relational phenomena, underpinned by the destruction of a plural space 
of meaning and the replacement of speech by animal roars. As Bérenger realises in Act II: 
‘Everyone’s in the same boat!’4  
 
Whereas townsfolk get used to these massive animals galloping around, Bérenger grows fearful, 
anxiously observing his friends either turn into beasts or become excessively tolerant towards 
them. He is berated for his intransigent insistence on the distinction between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’, ‘speech’ and ‘trumpeting’ and his refusal to adjust and ‘be happy in spite of everything’. 
His urgent desire to ‘do something about it’ is insufferable, and so it his feeling of responsibility: 
‘Sometimes one does harm without meaning to, or rather one allows it to go unchecked.’ (Act III). 
He ‘spoils everything’ with his ‘bad conscience’, he is a ‘neurotic with no sense of humour’. He 
stubbornly repeats that he will not accept the situation, that communication is impossible with the 
animals.  
 
He is told ‘rhinoceritis’ is a temporary epidemic and that those transformed ‘will get over it.’ 
Crucially for this paper, Bérenger remarks: ‘But it’s bound to have certain after-effect! An organic 
upheaval like than can’t help but have…’ (Act III) By the end, he is the only human. After a 
moment of ambivalent despair, he ‘snaps out of it’. His cry ‘I’m not capitulating!’ ends the play. 
 
The Rhinoceros is autobiographical: Ionesco was born to a Romanian father and a French-Jewish 
mother, whose family converted to Calvinism to avoid French anti-Semitism. He emigrated to 
Paris in 1942, when a military dictatorship ruled Romania, fighting WWII on Germany’s side. 
Before leaving, he witnessed the increasing popularity of the extreme-right party, the Iron Guard, 
whose nationalistic hallucinations infected part of the intelligentsia to which he belonged.5 The 
play is a direct comment on being seduced by totalitarian ideologies and thus becoming a 
                                                
4 Quinney remarks that in both French and English the plural of ‘rhinoceros’/’rhinocéros’ is identical to the singular 
(2007, p. 48). To this reader, this symbolises the relationalities underpinning ideological mobilisation. 
5 For an account of his journalistic work in the 1930s Bucharest see (Lupaș, 2014). 
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perpetrator, an accomplice, or a bystander in relation to authoritarian regimes that replace 
meaningful, plural dialogues with the trumpeting of intolerant visions. It is a fable for the slow, yet 
certain process of sliding into ideological conformism and accommodating oneself to systemic 
violence in a climate of monovocal, deafening trumpeting. Later in his life, Ionesco hinted the play 
spoke to the extremes of the left as well.6 A lucid reflection on violence’s societal underpinnings, 
the breakdown of communication and meaning, and their replacement with oppressive 
mystifications, it continues to be relevant today. The high cost of refusing ‘rhinoceration’ and a 
warning of its after-effects emerge as key themes. Bérenger sees the animals’ advent as a clash 
between humanism and ‘the law of the jungle’, an encounter between two species who cannot 
dialogue.7 Humans’ gradual invocation of the ‘Truth’ of the beauty and nobility of ‘Nature’ silences 
the refusenik. He is alienated – emotionally and epistemically – from both rhinoceros and humans: 
he can understand neither the animals’ trumpeting and nor his friends’ willingness to renounce 
human morality and meanings. Bérenger knows that such radical changes must have repercussions: 
at the end, he is trapped in his home, surrounded by hundreds of rhinoceros who stare at him 
through the windows. What will happen with these rhinoceros once the epidemic is over? And 
what can the Bérengers of the world do when that time comes – provided they survive? 
 
Widespread ideological accommodation to and complicity with systemic wrongdoing raise one of 
the most difficult challenges for societies dealing with a painful past. Rhinoceros magisterially reveals 
how complicity is mediated by ideology (‘trumpeting’), power structures and forms of sociality that 
normalise wrongdoing. Routinized, unreflective patterns of complicity or series of complicitous acts 
support stable structural violence. (Kissell 1999; Celermajer 2009; Applebaum 2010) Individuals 
are socially embedded, relational beings, located within a temporally and intersubjectively 
experienced social world, with which, in a deep sense, they are inescapably complicit.8 This 
embeddedness renders them vulnerable to that world’s ideological hi-jacking, to the colonisation 
                                                
6 Ionesco used the play to criticise the French under the Occupation, but also French intellectuals’ fascination with 
Stalin. (Quinney, 2007) Moreover, Bérenger provocatively wonders if the epidemic originated ‘in the colonies’ (Act 
III). 
7 A critic could object to the use of animalisation as a metaphor for the collapse of meaning. Would reducing 
ideologically blinded people to animals not preclude any engagement with them? Because he focuses on the 
loneliness of the resister Ionesco does not give us any clues how, but the transformation is reversible. Moreover, in 
their rhinoceros’ state, the townspeople maintain signs of human individuality (e.g. the Logician continues to wear a 
straw hat) and they can communicate with certain humans (for example, Mr. Boeuf, although already a rhinoceros, 
can express tenderness towards his wife). I thank Mónica Brito-Vieira and Maria Alina Asavei for the invitation to 
reflect on this point.  
8 Analysing intellectuals’ role in apartheid South Africa, Sanders (2002) proposes two senses of complicity. First, 
complicity inherent in sociality, which apartheid destroys by setting people apart. Second, discrete acts of complicity, 
for which individuals can be held accountable. While I find the distinction useful, I argue that there are some forms 
of sociability that we can be held responsible for because they can cumulatively and insidiously contribute to 
catastrophic wrongdoing. ‘Rhinocerised’ sociality is one example. 
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of its hermeneutical space by rhinoceros. Through rhinoceritis, abuses against certain groups 
become habitual and permissible, part of the everyday repertoire of social interaction. Thus, 
violations often go on unhindered for long periods (Crawford, 2007; Miller, 2008; Pankhurst, 
2008). Moreover, because, as Bérenger concludes, ‘Everyone’s in the same boat!’, the closing of 
the hermeneutical space is perpetuated beyond the re-founding moment by master narratives of 
reconciliation that strategically obscure generalised rhinoceration. 
 
Most frequently, political accounts of violence leave the structural-relational background of 
violence out of the picture.9 For example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
valued the healing potential of encounters between victims and perpetrators, mostly neglecting 
‘rhinoceration’ (Leebaw, 2011). Accounts of the systemic nature of apartheid – political, economic 
and epistemic – were side-lined and rendered inaudible by the TRC and its strategic celebration of 
‘the rainbow nation’. In a climate where the language of reconciliation was imposed as the only 
language for discussing apartheid, where admitting to having been a rhinoceros got perpetrators 
off the penal hook10 and public forgiveness emerged as a test of good character, revealing the limits 
of the TRC’s vision meant assuming the risk of being labelled a ‘spoiler’. The South African case 
is not exceptional. In post-WWII France, rationalising myths of résistencialisme – term coined by 
Henry Rousso to describe the myth of a unified Resistance (1987) – sidelined alternative, less 
flattering accounts. For decades after the war, the stability of résistencialisme prevented a meaningful 
opening of the hermeneutical space of political memory and the reckoning with widespread French 
anti-Semitism and attentisme during the Occupation. The Argentine ‘theory of the two demons’ is 
yet another example: the metaphor of the ‘two demons’ (referring to right wing militaries and left 
wing subversives) was used widely to depict the ‘Dirty War’. It established a problematic 
equivalence between the parties to the conflict and dislocated the conflict from its social 
embeddedness, placing it outside society. It therefore absolved of any responsibility those who 
lived prosperous lives, turning a blind eye to clandestine torture and executions centres dotting the 
country.  
 
These examples illustrate how hermeneutical erasure works. A community’s selective habits of 
historical remembering reflect various groups’ unequal access to processes of meaning-making 
                                                
9 Khoury recently discussed the shift from ‘grand’ to localised narratives in Late Modernity and has argued for 
retaining some features of grand narratives for our post-metaphysical times. (Khoury, 2017) I argue here that 
localized narratives can also be problematic in their selective inclusion of voices and ‘truths’, thus contributing 
skewed, self-interested, over-determined and intolerant ideas to a community’s pool of meanings.   
10 Amnesty covered state agents who committed crimes for ‘political reasons’ – in defence of apartheid – and who 
testified publicly.  
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(Fricker, 2007), which is itself a function of these groups’ relative social, economic and political 
positionality within the community. Shameful episodes and certain inconvenient groups’ voices 
are deleted from political memory – from history manuals, public museums, monuments, rituals. 
Due to the risk they pose to a community’s hegemonic self-understanding and to the distribution 
of power and privilege, widespread complicity and accommodation to systemic violence is 
frequently obscured from official memory. The cost of such manoeuvres cannot be 
underestimated: while the discomfort and destabilising potential associated with confronting these 
unsavoury elements is avoided, rhinoceritic forms of thought and behaviour – as well as their 
structural underpinnings – get reproduced over time, while the opportunities for meaningful 
democratic debates over the past are foregone. The memory actors who insists on problematising 
the grey zone are shunned – the label Nestbeschmutzer (nest fouler) is unwaveringly applied to them 
– and various strategies are deployed to delegitimise their claims.11 In trying to silence them, the 
spaces where productive friction between different perspectives can yield alternative meanings are 
closed-off. (Medina, 2013).  
 
This paper rejects the Nestbeschmutzer label and proposes instead to read such practices of 
contestation as expressions of caring refusal: the work of dissenting memory nurtures – rather 
than treasonously befouling – a plural space of memory-making. The caring refusenik challenges 
the political and practical continuities left untouched by the official sanctioning of neutralising 
projects of reconciliation. Avoiding both sentimental lamentation and morally inflexible 
invocations of a complete ‘Truth’ – that risk replacing one form of rhinoceritic trumpeting with 
another – she cultivates a self-reflective, humble clarity of vision. She is weary of any totalising 
vision of the past and mystification that neglects the recalcitrant sequelae of rhinoceritis. To 
unpack the refusenik’s risky labour of hermeneutical care, I now turn to care ethics in search for 
theoretical tools. 
 
Caring for the Hermeneutical Space 
 
In their often-cited definition, Tronto and Fisher state that care is ‘a species activity that includes 
everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our “world” so that we can live in it as well 
as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek 
to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.’ (Tronto & Fisher, 1990, p. 40)  In this section, I 
                                                
11 The third section introduces several such strategies. For a discussion of this label in practices of artistic 
contestation in relation to historically skewed narratives, please see my (2014) 
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embrace this extended view of care, which transcends the private as well as social policy areas that 
deal directly with caring (for example health or education) to propose a new, more general, but 
still relational object of care: the hermeneutical space of a community and the relations that 
constitute it. 
 
There are several aspects of (certain strands in) care ethics12 that make this philosophical 
perspective a useful tool for understanding what is at stake in refusing skewed visions of the past. 
First, care ethics presupposes a relational ontology: it opposes Kantian accounts of atomistic 
individuals, conceiving of humans as always embedded in concrete, complex relations of mutual 
dependency and attachment (Gilligan 1982; Tronto 1995; Bowden 1997; Sevenhuijsen 2003; 
Walker 2007; Held 2007; Stensöta 2015; Dingler 2015). These relations constitute us as individuals 
and so human agency and responsibility – including complicity – can only be understood by taking 
relationality seriously, in its political, economic and hermeneutical dimensions. Dependency and 
vulnerability are not aspects of human existence to be overcome, but an inextricable part of that 
very human existence. (Dingler, 2015; Robinson, 2011) Returning to this paper’s objectives, 
complicity with violence can only be understood relationally, aware of the fact that most people – 
if not everyone – is ‘in the same boat’. Moreover, hermeneutical relations – within collective 
meaning-making – are an important part of the social webs we always find ourselves within and 
we are dependent on others to have our voices heard. Reversely, we are vulnerable to practices of 
hermeneutical exclusion. The space between us can collapse when the imposition (trumpeting) of 
a certain vision silences alternative accounts. 
 
Second and relatedly, building and maintaining relationships is the goal of care. Taking the 
relationality of human experience seriously means that living well requires us to care – broadly 
speaking to nurture, sustain and protect (Robinson, 1998; Ruddick, 1995; Tronto, 1996) – these 
relationships. Embracing the relational theory of human agency and cultivating a concern for the 
quality of relations brings communication to the fore, including the need to attend to breakdowns 
in communication, whenever they occur (Bowden, 1997, p. 173). However, not all relationships 
are worth nurturing and protecting, some need discouraging and transforming, as care ethicists 
have clearly argued. Fiona Robinson writes 
 
                                                
12 Those which allow for the extension of caring practices beyond the limited space in which it has historically 
developed. 
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… an ethics of care must, in the context of social and practical relations, seek to uncover 
the relationships which exist among and within groups while, at the same time, maintaining 
a critical stance towards those relations… This, in turn, involves a thorough understanding 
of how relations are constructed and how difference is perceived and maintained through 
institutions and structures in societies. (Robinson, 1998, p. 30) 
 
Caring must confront the conditions and complex relationships that create the suffering it 
addresses, whatever its nature might be. It requires that we excavate the source of exclusions in 
socio-political structures of oppression. Interestingly for this paper, we need to have a deep 
knowledge of how these structures have oppressed and silenced certain individuals and groups 
within our communities to nurture different relations. Citing Robinson again, 
 
When an ethics of care is combined with a critical examination of how structural features 
of institutional relations enable or deform the abilities of all concerned to hear and to be 
heard, an ethics of care can combat exclusion and oppression … (1998, pp. 46–47) 
 
Refocusing again on the main task of this paper, we need to carefully listen so that problematic 
hermeneutical exclusions do not inform collective political memory-making, especially given the 
risk of resilient rhinoceration, i.e. of widespread susceptibility to trumpeting rather than dialogue. 
Caring for the plurivocality of the hermeneutical space requires a sustained fight against the 
stamping out of competing accounts of the past and for the cultivation of inclusive hermeneutical 
relationships between subjects. 
 
Third, caring presupposes several virtues13: sustained attention to the need for caring, taking 
responsibility, meeting caring needs and responsiveness to communication coming from the object 
of care. (Tronto, 1996) Caring is concrete, culturally specific and historically variable (Tronto, 
1996, p. 149). It can also involve frustration, conflict and getting hurt as ‘care relations are rarely 
reciprocal’ (Conradi, 2015, p. 122). Good care involves an ongoing commitment to the labour of 
care and a set of characteristics: thoughtfulness, patience, deliberativeness, good judgment, self-
knowledge and knowledge of the situation one cares for. (Ruddick, 1995) The availability of 
adequate resources for caring – material and intellectual – is essential. These features structure 
practices of care, such as mothering, nursing and friendship, but also political practices of 
                                                
13 For an account of why care cannot be merely a virtue, see (Held, 2007). Robinson also writes: ‘care ethics asks not 
only why should I case, but also how should I care, and how can I best promote caring personal and social relations 
among others.’ (Robinson, 1998, p. 29). 
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hospitability,14 i.e. welcoming refugees and supporting marginalised groups. This paper thus sees 
caring as the sustained preservation and nurturing of  ‘the social ties that bind groups together, … 
the bonds on which political and social institutions can be built.’ (Held, 2007, p. 31) In the wake 
of rhinoceration, these bonds need special care, targeting the space of meaning between differently 
positioned individuals and groups: 
 
If recognising vulnerability is the indispensable precondition for orienting the subject 
towards taking care of the world, nevertheless this does not just mean defending survival. 
It also requires us to ask a qualitative question: what world do we want to build as 
responsible subjects? (Pulcini, 2013, p. 13) 
 
Lastly, caring requires vigilance over the ever-present twin dangers of contamination and rejection. 
Contamination defuses the power of caring to transform the relations it targets: caring requires a 
form of commitment that, while emotionally anchored, remains lucid and avoids falling into both 
uncritical sentimentality and intransigent invocations of an alternative exclusionary ‘Truth.’15  
 
These three features of care ethics enable us to see the caring refusal of ‘grands récits’ of the past 
as the expression of a commitment to nurture, sustain and protect a hermeneutically open space 
of memory. Hermeneutical exclusions silence certain voices and accounts from collective 
processes of meaning-making. They are frequently the result of active – though not always 
conscious – efforts not to acknowledge the existence of different voices and visions. (Medina, 
2013, p. 31) This is often the result of a need not to know: knowing would destabilise a certain identity, 
including collective identities, which lie at the centre of this paper. Moreover, it would undermine 
distributions of social, economic and political privilege that inform and reflect that identity. As the 
examples of South Africa, Argentina and France mentioned above show, the erasure of certain 
inconvenient and shameful episodes from political memory in the name of trumpeted, selective 
views of ‘Reconciliation’ are a result of the more or less deliberate failure to improve hermeneutical 
inclusion.16 However, Mills has persuasively shown that we do have some agency to work on our 
                                                
14 Bowden includes citizenship as a site of practices of care but does not extrapolate beyond issues related to welfare 
policy. (1997)  
15 Discussing responses to globalisation, Pulcini (2013, p. 14) describes the subject who cares for the world while 
avoiding both heroic individualism and identitarian reification.  
16 This imposition was challenged by various types of memory actors – former resisters, activists, victims’ families, 
artists, public intellectuals – in all three cases, with mixed results. The literature on France’s struggles with memory 
make the object of a massive literature. For key texts, see (Rousso, 1987; Marrus & Paxton, 1995; Wieviorka, 2014). 
The initial enthusiasm about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was tempered by the 
realisation of what was left out form the pragmatically crafted official record. (Asmal, Asmal, & Roberts, 1997; 
Wilson, 2001; Leebaw, 2011; Sitze, 2013) Civil society organisations in Argentina engaged in protest and legal 
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hermeneutical environment. (2007). I propose that the caring refusenik takes up this responsibility 
– a responsibility she shares with others – and provides what Spivak poignantly calls ‘patient 
epistemological care’ (Spivak, 2013, p. 519, n. 57). Crucially, Spivak’s syntagm emphasises that 
redress cannot emerge from episodic attempts: it requires a dedicated effort to eradicate the 
‘monocultures of the mind’ (Spivak, 2013), counteract the reproduction of intolerant trumpeting, 
and nurture multiperspectival visions of the past.  
 
This will not be a painless exercise – and it will be all the more valuable for the discomfort it 
causes. Comfort is complacent and it cannot be the goal of care, not without qualification. Caring 
is motivated by a deep commitment to the well-being of the community, often by love for the 
community, but this does not exclude conflict. Opening prematurely closed books, excavating the 
structural underpinning of violence, revealing its relational nature and the impact of ideological 
contamination – are often rejected as treacherous manoeuvres to taint the ‘Nation’ or the ‘People’ 
by those who are bound to benefit from the stability of such an image. Because she is part of the 
relations that constitute it and has good familiarity with their history and organising structures, she 
appears as a traitor – a Nestbeschmutzer. The rejection of care ranges from dismissal to 
stigmatisation, marginalisation and ostracism: caring incurs certain costs and involves risks to the 
carer’s legitimacy and standing in the community.17 
 
To give concreteness to the abstract idea of caring refusal, I turn to Norman Manea’s work. Manea 
dedicated himself to rejecting problematically selective projects of memory-making and the 
oppressive hermeneutical relations they perpetuated. He targeted rhinoceration and its sequelae in 
the hermeneutical space he belonged to. Following a brief, contextually embedded biographical 
sketch, the paper analyses two modalities of caring refusal – his fiction and his essays on political 
memory in Romania. 
 
Norman Manea: A Life of Caring Refusal 
 
Norman Manea is a Romanian-Jewish writer born in Bukovina, a Romanian province, in 1936. 
During 1930s and 1940s the virulently anti-Semitic, extreme right movement and its party, the 
                                                
mobilisation to reverse Alfonsín’s and Menem’s compromises with the military. I discuss the Argentine case in 
(Mihai, 2014, 2016). In the broader project to which this paper is subsumed, I aim to analyse instances of 
hermeneutical caring from each of these three countries, for they all abound in such figures. 
17 In cases where many of the former regime’s henchmen remain in positions of power, they can pose a threat to the 
carer’s own life. The severity of the risks can only be contextually judged. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
inviting me to clarify this point.  
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Iron Guard – the forces that inspired Ionesco’s Rhinoceros – engage in atrocities against the Jewish 
population. During WWII, a right-wing military dictatorship – aligned with Germany – deports 
Moldavian and Bessarabian Jews to camps in Transnistria, which German-Romanian armies had 
occupied. Manea is expelled with his parents at the age of 5, a painful formative experience, most 
vividly captured in two of his stories ‘Proust’s Tea’ and ‘The Pullover’ (2016a) and in his auto-
biographical work, The Return of the Hooligan (2016b).18 The family returns to Romania in 1945 – 
just as the totalitarian, Soviet-sponsored communist regime was consolidating its power. As an 
adolescent, Manea briefly feels the lure of communism, but is soon disenchanted by its terror and 
ultra-nationalistic slippages. He initially trains as an engineer to avoid the political subordination 
of the literary world, though writing is his passion. After the 1960s, when the regime partially 
‘relaxes’ its policy of eliminating dissenters, he publishes several volumes, using post-modern codes 
to smuggle socially and politically critical material past the censorship. In parallel, he criticises 
certain ideological trends, which trigger the regime’s punitive response.  
 
At the age of 50, persecuted by the secret police for his writing and unable to continue living ‘a 
dissimulated life’ alongside the many rhinoceros surrounding him, he flees – eventually settling as 
a professor and author at Bard College. The exile was an extremely painful decision (Manea, 1999, 
2016b): in leaving his country he left a world and a language he was deeply attached to: ‘the 
linguistic shock of exile was, for my sensibility, a kind of second “Holocaust.”’ (Manea & Cotter, 
2003, p. 164). However, even from afar, he continues to toil for the pluralisation of the 
hermeneutical space through publications and interviews, now addressed to a wider public, which 
included the Romanian diaspora, itself not immune to nationalist mystifications. His works 
published from exile trigger virulent public debates especially after 1989. As I try to show below, 
this work betrays the unwavering commitment of the caring refusenik.  
 
This commitment is manifest in his entire oeuvre, but particularly in his fiction and essays. 
Through his writing, he effectively thematizes the continuities between the fascist ultra-nationalism 
of the 1930s and 1940s and the communist ultra-nationalism of Ceauşescu’s regime, which had 
absorbed extreme right’s principles. The reproduction of ultra-nationalist rhinocerations excluded 
alternative visions of the past, present and the future, colonizing the community’s space of 
meaning. Moreover, it perpetuated exclusionary ideas of belonging, reflected in the policy towards 
minorities. The official history, taught in schools and displayed in museums, erased Romania’s 
participation in the Holocaust. A narrative about the country’s ‘liberation’ from the ‘fascist yoke’ 
                                                
18 All translations are mine. 
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by the Red Army was conveniently propagated: there was no reckoning with the military campaign 
alongside Germany, the potent anti-Semitism of the 1930s and 1940s and its murderous effects 
within and beyond its borders (Comisia Internaţională pentru Studierea Holocaustului în România, 
2004). The state institutionalised a xenophobic myth of national re-founding, casting a dark 
shadow over Jewish, German and Hungarian Romanians. (Copilaş, 2015; Verdery, 1991) After 
1989, these myths don’t disappear: instead of marking a fresh start, the post-communist period 
reproduces old exclusionary ideas and relationships. The space of meaning refused to pluralize, 
and it is to this reality that Manea dedicates his attention, trying to pry open prematurely closed 
books. He also points out – historicizing, not moralizing – Romanians’ complicity with and 
involvement in these subsequent rhinocerations: ‘everyone was in the same boat’. His lens is sharp, 
but his perspective is always historically aware, sociologically informed and painfully reflective. His 
caring labour was grounded in self-knowledge and the knowledge of the space of meaning he 
shared with others. In what follows, I discuss how his care plays out in his essays and fiction.19 
 
Essays 
Manea’s repeated public attempts to problematise the replacement of one form of rhinoceration 
with another span across several decades. While still in Romania in the early 1980s, he targeted the 
resurrection of fascist ideas in one of the regime’s most visible public intellectuals’ work, C. V. 
Tudor. He discussed publicly – assuming important risks – the conflation of left and right 
ideologies, the gradual masquerading of public debates, the anti-Semitic turn in the press and the 
loss of intelligibility caused by the official wooden language. In response, Tudor tried to silence 
Manea by pressuring various repressive institutions to have his writings banned. For his lucid 
observations he was called ‘extraterritorial’, ‘cosmopolitan’, ‘traitor’ and ‘American spy’ – typical 
anti-Semitic slurs, that only confirmed his diagnosis. While the party distanced itself from Tudor’s 
position, anti-Semitism continued to inform official policy towards Jewish Romanians, ‘invited’ to 
emigrate to Israel. In exchange for a sum of money paid (per capita) by the Israeli government they 
could leave (Ioanid, 2015): ethnic purification was made lucrative.  
 
Manea himself was ‘given’ this ‘opportunity’ after he wrote about the elements of fascist 
rhinoceritis melding harmoniously with Ceauşescu’s version of national-communism into a 
stifling, official monologue, trumpeted by officials and intellectuals, artists and ordinary citizens, 
too terrorised, too comfortably co-opted or too numbed to oppose it. He decided to stay. In a 
                                                
19 The work of care I propose here can take a variety of forms, writing is just one of many. Political activism, 
rigorous historical research and legal mobilisation aiming to pluralise the space of meaning can also constitute 
practices of care.   
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1981 interview published in a provincial magazine, The Family Manea discusses how the imposed 
monovocality of public opinion, of literary production, published output and mass media 
forecloses the possibility of authentic engagement between an artist and her public. Such 
uniformity makes intellectual creativity impossible and annihilates the public’s capacity to make 
discerning judgments.20 In particular, he targets certain official newspapers’ xenophobia, drawing 
a direct connection between national communism and the extreme right of pre-WWII. Most 
importantly, he warns about the nefarious effects intellectual and political intolerance have on the 
public. Manea targets individual writers and their chauvinism only for their being symptomatic of 
bigger problems: his main concern lies with the kind of hermeneutical relationships that can be 
nurtured between citizens that do not share an ethnic or religious identity, a vision of the past and 
hopes for the future.  
 
This interview troubled the authorities with its diagnostic lucidity. The carer took important risks 
to discourage problematic visions of who counted as citizen and who could speak publicly and to 
show that the image of the future projected by the ultra-nationalist communists replicated the 
exclusions of the fascists. His most effective interventions, however, are essays published after 
1989, analysing the sequelae of rhinoceritis beyond the fall of the Iron Curtain. They are more 
effective because they did not need coding to avoid censorship – they appeared in US and 
Romanian newspapers in the 1990s. 
 
Manea devotes arduous efforts to explaining publicly why we must refuse the founding myths of 
1989 – just like he refused those of 1947.21 He rejects the second erasure of the Holocaust and the 
absolutist prioritisation of the Gulag in the emerging national narrative. This political manoeuvre 
allowed, once again, the seamless reproduction of xenophobic discourses and exclusionary 
relationships into the post-communist period. (Cugno, Manea, & Camiller, 1997; Molesworth, 
1997; Shafir, 2000; Stavans & Manea, 1997) The national myth imposed after 1989 focused on the 
communist crimes against the members of the democratic parties, and on the victimisation of the 
entire population. The immediate target of the successor regime were top officials, while the state 
apparatus and the multiple rhinoceros who kept it functioning were mostly left untouched.  
 
This political settlement – sponsored by the National Salvation Front (my emphasis), itself a 
successor to the Communist Party – was coupled with the uncritical rehabilitation of certain 
                                                
20 The incendiary claims made in that interview are included in the volume Despre Clovni/About Clowns (2013) 
21 In 1947 all parties were dissolved and their leaders purged by the Communist Party, supported by the Soviet 
Union. 
 16 
intellectuals of the 1930s, many of whom Ionesco knew personally and had already included in the 
herd of rhinoceros: Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, and Constantin Noica were rediscovered and 
canonised. For their work in the history of religion and philosophy, Eliade and Cioran had 
obtained international fame after WWII. The Romanian intellectual elite wanted to reclaim them 
for the Romanian culture, to signal the country’s natural place in Europe. This took a careful 
editing of their political biographies, especially their association with the extreme-right Iron Guard. 
(Shafir, 2000) Manea took on the task of a careful, patient and civil engagement with the 
proponents of this exercise in revisionist historical recuperation, highlighting the incompatibilities 
between their skewed vision of the past and the desire to transition to a democratic future.22 While 
he discusses these intellectuals’ shameful political biographies, his aim is not simply to discredit 
them or to antagonise their unreflective canonisers. Working contextually, Manea traces 
genealogically the origins of xenophobic ideas in the 19th C and the political institutions’ incapacity 
to deal with the demographic pluralism resulting from Romania’s territorial gains after WWI. He 
is concerned with historical processes and path dependencies, missed opportunities to pluralise 
the hermeneutical space and the effect of these occlusions on the future of democracy: the 
integration of the enemies of democracy within the cultural canon rendered difficult the cultivation 
of inclusive visions and political relationships after 1989. He shows these ideas’ structural 
embedding and intergenerational reproduction in the national institutions and common sense. 
While detractors read his interventions superficially and unfairly as an unpatriotic 
Nestbeschmutzer’s character assassination projects, this paper argues that they reflect an attempt 
to render visible the devastating effects enduring rhinoceritis can have on the present and the 
future of the community.  
 
As the post-1989 political and intellectual elites fell prey to the old habit of exclusionary 
trumpeting, Manea injected some contestability in the closed hermeneutical space, trying render it 
hospitable to a plurality of views and voices about the past. To the resilient legacies of nationalism, 
he opposes the recuperation of interwar democratic thought. His essays invite a more discriminate 
and encompassing approach to collective meaning-making practices. In doing this, he performs 
the patient labour of nurturing the plurivocality and kaleidoscopicity of the public space, assuming 
the costs of frustration and rejection.  
 
 
                                                
22 I am relying here especially on the essays collected in Despre Clovni/About Clowns (2013) but also interviews he gave 
to various outlets, e.g. (Ungureanu, 2012). 
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Fiction 
Manea’s fiction deploys powerful artistic devices to problematise rhinoceration. It is impossible to 
do justice to his vast oeuvre here. Instead, I focus on one novella that I argue best captures his 
insightful concern with the collapse of meaning and attempt to challenge it.  
 
Published in 1981 in Romania, ‘Biografia robot’ (‘Identikit Biography’) addresses the continuities 
between the extreme right and extreme left rhinocerations by humorously outlining the biography 
of a communist activist, written in a wooden language that simulates the style of both party 
propaganda and secret police reports. Deplaying humour, Manea turns the language against itself 
to trace the effects of intolerant trumpeting and the difficulty of overcoming it.  
 
During his youth, the aspiring revolutionary ‘oscillated between extremes, from the right to the 
left and back again to the right’ until he finally found the path towards the ‘one true revolution’ 
(2011, p. 66). As a journalist, he aligns his newspaper, emblematically called The Trumpet, to the 
party’s goals and insists on writing all the editorial articles himself. He displays ‘a principled, 
intransigent attitude. During party meetings … he stands out for his harsh rejection of the others’ 
attempts to question the party line or their indulgence towards grave deviations’ by plotters and 
seditionists. ‘He tirelessly leads a campaign against conciliation, liberalism, petty bourgeois 
tendencies’ (2011, p. 80) He earns the nickname ‘the Corporal’, ‘not because of the obtuseness 
with which he interprets instructions … but because he always enunciates his orders and rebukes 
while frowning, probably unconsciously, and rudely, in a hoarse, shrieking voice.’ (2011, p. 81) The 
‘Corporal’ changes many jobs in different branches of the socialist economy and works for various 
local publications, always distinguishing himself through his obdurate ideological zeal. He even 
lands a post with the Romanian Orthodox Patriarch, whom he helps navigate the ideological 
context – this is Manea’s jab at the Orthodox Church’s happy collusion with the regime to protect 
its properties and privileges. Before retirement, we find the ‘Corporal’ in an office job, working as 
a financial inspector in a branch of the state’s savings trust. Though old, he retains the strength of 
his commitments: he is angered by the younger generations’ lack of revolutionary enthusiasm, by 
their loss of the necessary ‘fanatical faith’ (2011, p. 104). He presents his boss with a proposal that 
the winners of the trust’s yearly lottery to be allocated not by chance, but according to political 
and moral merit to the most hardworking and dedicated party members. The old activist does not 
want to leave anything to chance in the class struggle. 
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Studying this character through a temporally dynamic perspective shows both the malleability and 
the stability of rhinoceritis. The Corporal’s identikit initially instantiates the harmonious melding 
of the extreme right (he leaves his paternal home to join the Foreign Legion) and extreme left 
ideology (he dedicates his mature years to the communist party), as well as his incapacity to tolerate 
pluralism and dissent. Humour emerges from the use of the party’s linguistic tropes against the 
very purpose for which they were devised: propaganda and control. Manea manipulates the rigid 
set-phrasing typical of regime speak to reveal the activist’s rhinoceritis, thus subverting the 
legitimacy of his epochal mission.  
 
Humour is also used to capture the state’s control over time, which it renders predictable through 
the twin process of fixing the future as ‘Golden’ and the co-optation of large groups to the state’s 
revolutionary mission. At the Institute of Futurology – a metaphor for the entire country – the 
new director wishes to expand its research scope. (2011) He does so by diversifying the pool of 
collaborators. Alongside the mathematicians, psychologists, physicists, medics and jurists, the 
director recruits a dactylographer, a taxi driver, a restaurant manager, a kindergarten teacher, a 
novelist, a human resource manager, a gym teacher, a customs officer and a bank inspector – a 
reference to the broad professional spectrum the duplicitous swamp encompasses. In suggesting 
that some of the new members had had different, elite professions before WWII Manea alludes 
to the co-optation of former ‘class enemies’. During their meetings, the members discuss ‘the 
future, i.e. something inexistent. In any case, something that does not yet exist. That is to say, 
heaven.’ (2011, p. 73) This is an oblique reference to the Golden Age of communist prosperity 
and progress, announced on TV screens, in newspapers and history textbooks. Contesting this 
vision would have had grave repercussions. To prepare for heaven, the Institute’s members study 
topics such as  ‘dissimulated behaviour’, ‘militarism in the kindergartens’, ‘the partial truth: between 
principle and practice’, ‘sport as therapy and diversion’, ‘suspicion and surveillance’ ‘manipulating 
discontent’ and ‘the synoptic of captive happiness’. (Manea, 2011, p. 61). Manea conjures these 
topics by humorously altering themes from communist propaganda materials. The system, 
however, has some cracks: first, a short story entitled ‘The Taedium Syndrome’ – a direct reference 
to the ideological stultification of the nation – somehow makes its way on the agenda, giving rise 
to excited reactions. Second, a visit to the psychiatric hospital shocks the institute’s members as 
the patients demonstrate a lucid, nuanced perception of reality. The director makes sure such 
deviations are combated and that discussions revert to accepted themes. 
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The novella captures the collapse of Romanian hermeneutical space through the fixing of the 
scope of the possible: the future can only be heaven. Ideological deviations are severely sanctioned. 
Rhinoceration’s chameleonic nature emerges clearly, affecting all strata of the social world, though 
some are exceptionally acerbic. The hijacking of language is simultaneously revealed and 
undermined through Manea’s precise humour, which destabilises the petrified party speak. Most 
importantly for this paper, the almost complete colonisation of the public space is made apparent 
with its complex co-optation mechanisms.  
 
Having reconstructed these caring interventions, let me zoom in on several aspects of this 
sustained work. As we saw in the previous section, caring must avoid condescension or reproach, 
and embrace humility, reflexivity and sustained concern.23 Crucially, it must rely on a deep 
knowledge of problem – in this case, the historical sources of rhinoceritis. Manea’s fictional and 
journalistic works avoid moralising and individualising what is essentially a political problem: while 
individuals’ ideas are discussed symptomatically, they are always contextualised within broader 
historical and geographical contexts and processes. Manea works in panoramic mode, trying to 
understand the complex social mechanisms that lead to rhinoceration and the mystification of 
history. His essays are written in a graceful and balanced tone, firm but not virulent. Stylistically 
too, Manea refuses rhinoceration. While his novella might be read as a biting satire, I argue he 
focuses on the activist only as a prop for his critique of the collapse of meaning. His depiction of 
the members of the Futurology Institute is compassionate, discriminate and contextual, disclosing 
both the overwhelming power of the state and the spaces – however small – of resistance.  
 
Caring presupposes that knowledge of the object of care must be accompanied by self-knowledge. 
Once his work was published, Manea became aware that his perseverance in trying to be a writer 
constituted a partial form of duplicity with the order. He reflected on the risks of contamination 
and admitted openly that other writers had been more heroic: he self-critically discusses his limited 
opposition to the regime. (Cugno et al., 1997) His pointing to the rhinoceration of most social 
strata is underpinned by a perpetual process of soul-searching – lest he should himself fall prey to 
the moral ‘viscosity’ of decades of authoritarianism, green and red.  
  
                                                
23 Bohle discusses honorary witnesses’ practice of attentive, anticipatory listening of testimonies by survivors of the 
residential school system before the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He argues this practice 
performs two contradictory roles: ‘it makes space for claims and stories which might yet exceed hegemonic 
narratives, and re-presents those claims as part of the public discourse they come to shape.’ (2017, p. 261) I believe 
this be read as another modality of carrying out a patient labour of care for an inclusive hermeneutical space. 
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Reflecting in his own positionality, Manea understands himself as a writer-citizen, whose work 
always involves hazards and difficulties, of which he is painfully conscious: 
  
I really believed in this double, complementary integrity: that the writer should remain, in 
his work, faithful to the artistic criterion and, in his social life, he should keep his social 
moral fortitude in confronting the lies directed by the manipulators of public life. This was 
never and nowhere easy. (Stavans & Manea, 1997, p. 104)  
 
Manea hopes that a complete account of the past is impossible, which is for the better because 
thus there will always be room for ‘uncertainty, questioning, discovering, room for literature.’ 
(Stavans and Manea, 1997, 105).24 Contributing to the space of meaning by injecting uncertainty 
and questioning all too facile, stifling accounts of history requires sustained emotional attachment, 
which must not, however, degenerate into sentimentalism: 
 
‘[S]chooled early in the traumas of dislocation and dispossession, of foreseeable and 
unforeseeable danger … I can no longer stand the old role of victimhood. It sickens me. I 
try as much as I can to avoid becoming a specialist on lamentation.’ (Manea & Cotter, 2003, 
p. 164) 
 
His compassion for the object of his care – the relationships between citizens and the plurality of 
the space where they meet – is evident as, though not devoid of conflict, his caring is never cruel: 
his interventions are non-hierarchically pedagogic. In his fiction and in his essays he sees citizens 
as ‘human beings, imperfect and vulnerable to hope’ living in ‘one of the most cunning and sadistic’ 
systems that ever existed and that ‘knew perfectly how to … manipulate them.’  (Cugno et al., 
1997, pp. 123, 127) In his novels, essays and short stories, he caringly engages with the pernicious 
effects of a grotesque, circus-like existence, in which everyone slowly becomes complicitous, most 
frequently because of a dire lack of alternatives.  
 
In an interview from 2012, he says: ‘I do not believe that the writes should take on the role of the 
prosecutor …I think he writer’s mission is to understand. To understand the criminal, the 
oppressor, in general human experience.’ (Ungureanu, 2012) A complex understanding of the 
object of care, and not moralistic judgment, is necessary. Observing the deterioration of human 
relationships and the affirmation of meaningless, official trumpeting of ‘Truth’, Manea assumed a 
                                                
24 For an account of the positive value of ambiguity in relation to reconciliation, see (Schaap, 2008). 
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personal responsibility to nurture plural and inclusive relationships, taking on the (most probably) 
Sisyphean labour of challenging skewed, mystifying accounts of history. 
 
The complex work of this refusenik cannot be exhausted within the space of a paper of this size. 
The hope is that sufficient evidence has been produced to justify the value of Manea’s work for 
thinking about the refusal to reconcile. He exemplifies how one can caringly reject grand narratives 
that keep the hermeneutical space closed, amplifying the enduring effects of rhinoceration. Rather 
than conceiving of his interventions as ‘spoiler acts’, I suggest they nurture the pool of meanings 
that we can – and should – rely on in reckoning with the grey complexities of the past and their 
reverberations into the present. The refusal of facetious, obscuring projects of reconciliation and 
‘Truth’ – that leave untouched violence-genic forms of social relationality and stigmatise doubt – 




This paper drew the portrait of the caring refusenik of grands récits of political memory. It has 
relied on Ionesco’s metaphor of ‘rhinoceration’ to capture the destruction of a hermeneutical space 
and the replacement of its rich pool of interpretive resources by ideological roars. Denying 
rhinoceration altogether or invoking stability, social peace, glowing futures of reconciliation and 
flourishing, national re-founding myths provide selective inventories of the past. More importantly 
still, they fail to open the hermeneutical space to dialogue, thus reproducing habits of intractable 
mono-vocalism. The repercussions can be felt within processes of politically ‘fixing’ the memory 
of totalitarianism. Using Romania as a case study, I sought to highlight the sequelae – substantially 
in terms of the reproduction of certain ideas about the ‘Nation’, and formally in terms of its total 
colonisation of the space of memory. Building on care ethics, this paper has foregrounded the 
valuable, strenuous labour of refusing any narrative that even remotely sounds like trumpeting.   
 
Manea is a caring refusenik, whose concern for the politico-hermeneutical space he inhabited 
endured for decades. His writing and public interventions amount to a sustained labour, that 
sought to foster meaningful dialogue and preserve nuance in conversations about subsequent 
founding myths and settlements. He did not waver, despite the suffering he experienced when his 
care was rejected. Crucially, rejection made him more reflexive about his strategies of caring, his 
own duplicity and contamination risks, as well as the limits of care inherent in his positionality. 
Manea’s deep, emotionally anchored commitment to the rich world of meaning his language 
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supplied, his awareness of what it took to forge political-interpretive relations that could withstand 
rhinoceration, and his lifelong dedication to cultivating such relations make him an exemplary 
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